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Abstract Function allocation is a core activity of the
human–machine systems discipline. Sixty years ago, Paul
Fitts marked the outset of function allocation research with
an 11-statements list. Since then numerous function allo-
cation methods have been proposed, but strikingly the
seminal Fitts list spans the entire history of this domain and
continues to be cited today. In this paper, we intend to
explain why the Fitts list is such a pervasive factor in
function allocation research, despite having received
extensive criticism. We invoke philosophy of science, and
we show that the Fitts list fulfils six important criteria for
appraising scientific theories: plausibility, explanatory
adequacy, interpretability, simplicity, descriptive adequacy,
and generalisability. Furthermore, we show that the Fitts
report identified issues which decades later became known
as the ironies of automation. We conclude that the Fitts list
is an adequate approximation that captures the most
important regularity of automation, and that the Fitts report
represents an unprecedented intellectual achievement that
has succeeded in its pioneering objective.
Keywords The Fitts list  MABA–MABA  Function
allocation  Human–machine systems
1 Introduction to function allocation
Deciding which functions (tasks, jobs) of a human–
machine system should be allocated to the human and
which to the machine (today often a computer) is one of the
most essential activities within human factors research
(Hancock and Scallen 1996; Price 1985). In 1951, the Fitts
list (Fitts 1951) marked the beginning of function alloca-
tion research, and six decades later it continues to be cited
(Fig. 1). In fact, almost any study on the topic of function
allocation starts with discussing the now classic report
edited by Paul Fitts. Some regard the Fitts list as an ade-
quate starting point or a set of accepted statements,
which—although it should not be applied literally, without
further thought—constitutes the foundation of function
allocation. At the same time, the Fitts list has received
extensive criticism, ranging from it being considered an
intrinsically flawed descriptive listing (Hancock and Scal-
len 1996), ‘a useful starting point (but only that)’ (Meister
1971, p. 63), to simply insufficient, outdated, static, and
unable to acknowledge the organisational context and the
complementarity of human and machine (Bye et al. 1999;
Clegg et al. 1989; Hoffman et al. 2002; Jordan 1963).
Despite the severe criticisms, according to a review article
having collected the opinions of a dominant group of
practitioners involved in the application of function allo-
cation methods in systems design, the Fitts list (or variants
thereof) is still the most widely used function allocation
technique (Older et al. 1997).
This article sets out to explain why the Fitts list has been
such a pervasive factor throughout the history of function
allocation research. We argue that the Fitts list can be
regarded as a function allocation theory, and we invoke
philosophy of science to show that the Fitts list fulfils
the criteria for appraising scientific theories, namely
J. C. F. de Winter (&)  D. Dodou
Department of BioMechanical Engineering,
Faculty of Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering,
Delft University of Technology, Mekelweg 2,
2628 CD Delft, The Netherlands
e-mail: j.c.f.dewinter@tudelft.nl
123
Cogn Tech Work (2014) 16:1–11
DOI 10.1007/s10111-011-0188-1
plausibility, explanatory adequacy, interpretability, sim-
plicity, descriptive adequacy, and generalisability.
2 What is the Fitts list?
The Fitts list is a list of 11 statements about whether a
human or a machine performs a certain function better
(Table 1; Fig. 2). In the Fitts list—also known by the
acronym MABA–MABA (‘Men are better at, Machines are
better at’), first appeared in 1970 (Rappaport 1970) and
more regularly since the 1980s (Parsons 1981; Price
1985)—human and machine are construed as actuating and
information processing systems with different capabilities,
on the basis of which it is possible to determine what
should be automated and what not. In its literal interpre-
tation, the Fitts list recommends that those functions that
are better performed by machines should be automated,
while the other functions should be assigned to the human
operator.
The Fitts list is treated in Chap. 3, entitled ‘Some basic
questions in designing an air navigation and traffic control
system’, of an 84-page report that aimed to be a ‘pio-
neering effort’ (Fitts 1951, p. iii; cover letter by M.S.
Viteles, chairman of the NRC Committee on Aviation
Psychology) for human engineering research and to have a
beneficial effect on research and plans for future air traffic
control systems. The report consists of nine chapters and
three appendices, and covers various topics, including
communication, displays, systems research, and proposals
for future research. Paul Fitts was the editor of the report,
which had nine more authors (A. Chapanis, F. C. Frick, W.
R. Garner, J. W. Gebhard, W. F. Grether, R. H. Henneman,
W. E. Kappauf, E. B. Newman, and A. C. Williams, Jr.),
who ‘are recognised today, with Fitts, as some of the
‘founding fathers’ of human factors science’ (Hancock and
Scallen 1996, p. 25). A further 25 people in aviation,
engineering, and research were also acknowledged to have
contributed to draft versions of the report and group
meetings.
As explained in the report, the aim was to ‘search for a
general answer to the problem of dividing responsibility
between men and machines’ (p. 6) while not ‘trying to be
unduly specific’ (p. 11). Although the authors were clear-
cut by saying that ‘many of the facts that we know about
human beings are pertinent to decisions about the division
of labour between men and machines’ (p. 11, italics
added), and by considering ‘the roles men and machines


















Fig. 1 Annual number of citations of the terms: ‘Fitts list’; ‘MABA–
MABA’; ‘HABA MABA’; ‘men are better at’ and ‘machines are
better at’; ‘humans are better at’ and ‘machines are better at’; ‘man
are better at’ and ‘machines are better at’; or citing the original Fitts
report (1951). Irrelevant references have been manually removed. The
figure was derived using Google Scholar, which includes reports that
cannot be retrieved by other bibliographical databases and therefore
offers a clearer view of the historical trend
Table 1 The original Fitts list (Fitts 1951, p. 10)
Humans appear to surpass present-day machines in respect
to the following:
Present-day machines appear to surpass humans in respect
to the following:
1. Ability to detect a small amount of visual or acoustic energy
2. Ability to perceive patterns of light or sound
3. Ability to improvise and use flexible procedures
4. Ability to store very large amounts of information for long periods
and to recall relevant facts at the appropriate time
5. Ability to reason inductively
6. Ability to exercise judgment
1. Ability to respond quickly to control signals and to apply great force
smoothly and precisely
2. Ability to perform repetitive, routine tasks
3. Ability to store information briefly and then to erase it completely
4. Ability to reason deductively, including computational ability
5. Ability to handle highly complex operations, i.e.
to do many different things at once.
Fig. 2 Illustrations of the Fitts list taken from the original 1951
report (Fitts 1951, pp. 7–8)
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should have in the future air navigation and traffic control
system’ (p. 10, italics added), at the same time they were
hesitant to draw definite conclusions. For example, it was
pointed out that ‘a listing of those respects in which human
capabilities surpass those of machines must, of course, be
hedged with the statement that we cannot foresee what
machines can be built to do in the future’ (pp. 6–7). Fur-
thermore, the authors recognised that technical feasibility,
economic issues, training, maintenance of skills, job life,
equipment maintenance, and calibration may also be rele-
vant to function allocation.
In other words, the aim of the Fitts list was to make
general statements about future function allocation, and it
was not meant ‘as a kind of gospel’ or ‘the function allo-
cation counterpart of Moses’ 10 commandments, or
Luther’s 95 theses’ (Sheridan 2000, p. 203) as many human
factors engineers have taken it.
3 The Fitts list as a scientific theory
Fuld (2000) argued that function allocation ‘is a useful the-
ory but not a practical method’ (p. 231). We point out that the
very purpose of science is theory development and the
organisation of knowledge in the form of testable explana-
tions, rather than merely being a practical method. In this
article, we regard the Fitts list as a scientific theory, and from
this perspective, its aim is to explain (or predict) allocation of
function decisions already made, not to be used to guide
engineering decisions. A function allocation theory should
have broad generalisability and apply to a rich variety of real
human–machine systems, and at the same time it should
accurately describe which functions should be allocated (or
are currently allocated) to human and machine.
Below, we invoke philosophy of science to help in
judging the adequacy of the Fitts list as a scientific theory,
and to explain why the Fitts list has been such a persistent
factor throughout the history of function allocation. Three
of the most commonly used axiological values in evaluat-
ing the appropriateness of scientific theories are precision,
generality, and simplicity (Cutting 2000; Popper 1959;
Speekenbrink 2005), although other values are regularly
included as well. For example, Kuhn (1977) listed five
criteria, sometimes designated as ‘The Big Five’: accuracy,
consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness. In this
article, we use a similar, but more comprehensive, set of
criteria for appraising theories (models), which was com-
posed for the cognitive sciences. This set was originally
proposed by Jacobs and Grainger (1994), and later adapted
by Pitt et al. (2002):
(a) Plausibility: Are the assumptions of the model
plausible?
(b) Explanatory adequacy: Is the theoretical explanation
reasonable and consistent with what is known?
(c) Interpretability: Do the model and its parts make
sense? Are they understandable?
(d) Simplicity: Does the model capture the phenomenon
in the least complex manner?
(e) Descriptive adequacy: Does the model provide a good
description of observed data?
(f) Generalisability: Does the model predict well the
characteristics of new, as yet unobserved data?
The Fitts list can be argued to fulfil these criteria for
appraising scientific models, each of which is addressed
below.
3.1 Plausibility
The Fitts list makes various assumptions. The psycholog-
ical needs of the human (affective and emotional require-
ments, job satisfaction, motivation, fatigue, stress, working
under time pressure), temporal effects (learning, contextual
variations), individual differences, safety, economic utility,
availability, maintainability, the rapid evolution of tech-
nology, social values, the iterative design process, task
complexity and interconnectedness between functions, as
well as the organisational and cultural context, are all not
modelled (e.g. Chapanis 1965; Clegg et al. 1989; Drury
1994; Greenstein and Lam 1985; Hancock and Scallen
1996; Price 1985; Sanders and McCormick 1987). Fur-
thermore, the possibility that there will be tasks that neither
machines nor humans can do well, or that both can do
equally well, is ignored (Clegg et al. 1989; Price 1985).
The fact that the Fitts list does not take into account
dynamic allocation has also been pointed out by many:
‘Frustration with the MABA–MABA approach led to a
very simple insight. Why should function, tasks, etc. be
strictly allocated to only one performer? Aren’t there many
situations whether either human or computer could perform
a task acceptably? …This insight led to identification of the
distinction between static and dynamic allocation of
functions and tasks’ (Rouse 1994, p. 29, as quoted by In-
agaki 2003). Hancock and Scallen (1996) argued against
this acontextuality of the list by stating that ‘at all points in
the design process, the allocation problem is chronically
underspecified. That is, there is never sufficient knowledge
of the situation so that all tasks can be described in Fitts-
like terms and apportioned respectively’ (p. 27).
Researchers dissatisfied by the general nature of the Fitts
list have proposed extended and fine grained models of
function allocation. Today, numerous fine-grained function
allocation models can be found in the literature (for over-
views, see Older et al. 1997; Parasuraman et al. 2000),
including variations and extensions of the Fitts list (Bekey
Cogn Tech Work (2014) 16:1–11 3
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1970; Chapanis 1960; Ip et al. 1990; Sanders and
McCormick 1987; Swain and Guttman 1980; US Depart-
ment of Defense 1987), qualitative or quantitative multi-
criteria analyses (Meister 1987; Papantonopoulos 2001),
expected value analyses (Sheridan and Parasuraman 2000),
flow charts to assist in the design process (Malone and
Heasly 2003), mental workload analyses and psychophys-
iological techniques (Hancock and Chignell 1988; Pope
et al. 1995; Prinzel et al. 2003; Reising and Moss 1986;
Wei et al. 1998), intent inferencing models (Geddes 1985;
Govindaraj and Rouse 1981; see Parasuraman et al. 1992
for an overview), cognitive models (Corker et al. 1997;
Degani et al. 1999; see Parasuraman 2000 for an over-
view), network optimisation (Shoval et al. 1993), and
queuing theory (Chu and Rouse 1979; Rouse 1977; Wu
et al. 2008). The focus has shifted towards dynamic task
allocation (Byrne and Parasuraman 1996; Debernard et al.
1992; Greenstein and Lam 1985; Hancock and Scallen
1996; Kantowitz and Sorkin 1987; Parasuraman et al.
1996; Rencken and Durrant-Whyte 1993; Rieger and
Greenstein 1982; Rouse 1988; Scerbo 2007; Sharit 1996),
and it is increasingly recognised that automation is not a
zero-sum game but can be designed for different levels of
human or machine authority and for different processing
stages, such as information acquisition, information anal-
ysis, decision making, and action implementation (Endsley
and Kaber 1999; Parasuraman et al. 2000).
Function allocation models are often evaluated in terms
of the number of requirements fulfilled (cf., Older et al.
1997). Consequently, it is tempting to increase the mod-
el’s complexity such that it captures a greater variability,
for example by including dynamic allocation, trade-offs,
and iterative design. However, the fine-grained function
allocation models specified above tend to be restricted in
scope. In contrast to the Fitts list, they address specific
areas, such as when to switch between human and
machine as a function of human workload and task
accuracy, and specific applications, for example, the
ground collision avoidance system tested on fighter air-
craft (Hardman et al. 2009). Our observations here are in
line with a review about quantitative models in automa-
tion by Parasuraman (2000), which concluded that ‘the
price of quantification may be a reduction in generality’
(p. 945).
Furthermore, many of the newly proposed function
allocation models have limited validity, and have been
evaluated in laboratory environments only. As Hollnagel
and Cacciabue (1999) rightly pointed out, it is necessary to
stay in touch with reality: ‘Investigations that are driven by
laboratory and experimental concerns all too easily end up
by looking at phenomena that are derived from the theories
and models alone. While such investigations may be
valuable to determine whether the theories are good
theories, in the sense that they can be used to make pre-
dictions, they do little to determine whether the theories are
valid, i.e. whether they are about real phenomena’ (p. 5).
Importantly, several quantitative function allocation mod-
els require complicated calculations even for simple tasks,
and do not taken into consideration the contextual reality
(Parasuraman et al. 1992). For example, Wu et al. (2008)
used a queuing network-model human processor to
dynamically control the delay times between messages of
in-vehicle systems presented to car drivers. Their approach
relied on intricate calculations from a cognitive model to
provide a numeric estimate of human workload as a
function of age, speed, and curvature of the road, as well as
a message controller determining optimal delay times
between messages. Although their approach provides a
precise quantitative estimate of workload, it can be ques-
tioned whether their calculations will be valid outside the
laboratory environment, in which drivers are subjected to
many environmental influences.
We argue that it is illusory and objectionable to expect
that a scientific model should capture all the variables
described above. Function allocation models should not
gain credence merely because they include so many vari-
ables that any possible case can be described. The inap-
propriate tendency of researchers to strive for perfect-fit
models has also been recognised by Roberts and Pashler
(2000): ‘The use of good fits as evidence is not supported
by philosophers of science nor by the history of psychol-
ogy; there seem to be no examples of a theory supported
mainly by good fits that has led to demonstrable progress’
(p. 358). Scientific models are always imperfect to a certain
degree in their attempt to maintain predictive validity and
to parsimoniously capture the phenomenon of interest (e.g.
MacCallum 2003).
What is important in terms of scientific adequacy is
whether the assumptions made by a model are plausible.
The assumptions of the Fitts list are plausible because
they have managed to capture the most important regu-
larity of automation: if the machine surpasses the human,
the function must be automated; if not, it does not make
sense to automate. The Fitts list states that the primary
(but not necessarily the only) driving force behind auto-
mation should be performance: precision, power, speed,
cost. These are factors that Sheridan (2004) called ‘the
obvious advantages of automation’ (p. 163), while Wic-
kens (1992) similarly explained that the purpose of
automation is improving performance, namely: ‘perform-
ing functions that the human operator cannot perform
because of inherent limitations … performing functions
that the human operator can do but performs poorly or at
the cost of a high workload … augmenting or assisting
performance in areas in which humans show limitations’
(pp. 531–532).
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3.2 Explanatory adequacy
The Fitts list is internally consistent in the sense that its 11
statements are diverse and non-contradictory. The Fitts list
has a solid theoretical basis because it was developed ‘on
the basis of what psychologists know at the present time
about the limiting characteristics of human capacity and
performance’ (p. 5), including overload, stress, fatigue,
inattention, boredom, and short-term memory, and it used
an information-processing approach (or communication
theory in the terms used in the report), a dominant para-
digm within cognitive psychology and human factors
research (Proctor and Vu 2010). Even some of the strongest
critics of the Fitts list recognised that the comparative
nature of human and machine is theoretically an elegant
solution to the allocation of functions and that ‘the facts to
be found in all the existing versions of the Fitts list are all
correct’ (Jordan 1963, p. 162).
3.2.1 The rejection of comparability
A number of researchers have criticised the theoretic
foundations of the Fitts list by arguing against its elemen-
taristic (atomistic, reductionistic, materialistic, mechanistic
or information processing) character that forces a descrip-
tion of humans based on machine capabilities and human
limitations. They have suggested that the Fitts list implies
separation and comparability of human and machine, and
that complementarity is what is important instead (Camp-
bell and Essens 1996; Goom 1996; Fallon 2006; Jordan
1963; Hoffman et al. 2002; Hollnagel and Bye 2000;
Kantowitz and Sorkin 1987). As Hancock (2009) noted:
‘For a variety of reasons, although this endeavour is well
intentioned, this bipartite approach is unlikely to succeed
either in principle or in practice. In principal it is a falla-
cious approach since it acts to dichotomize human and
machine in the very instances where the human–machine
linkage should be the unit of concern’ (p. 100).
A growing chorus of researchers favouring the comple-
mentarity viewpoint have found resort in theories that
appraise overall function congruence and function matching
with the aim to fulfil higher-order commitments such as
maintaining control and resilience (Dekker and Hollnagel
1999; Dekker 2011; Hollnagel 2004; Hollnagel et al. 2006;
McCarthy et al. 2000). The focus herein is on the com-
plexity and emergent behaviour of systems and on the
importance of reciprocal relationships and complementarity
(as well as joint work, teamwork, team play, partnership,
cooperation, collaboration, joint performance, respect or
symbiosis) between human and machine (Bye et al. 1999;
Christoffersen and Woods 2002; Dekker 2011; Downs et al.
1988; Grote et al. 1995; Hancock 1993; Hoc 2001; Leveson
2004; Malin et al. 1991). A more extreme form of these
theories entails the complete rejection of the notion of an
a priori allocation of functions. In a series of articles,
Dekker and Woods (2002), Dekker and Hollnagel (2004)
and Hollnagel and Woods (2005) rejected function alloca-
tion completely, and the Fitts list in particular, on the
grounds that it relies on the so-called ‘substitution myth’ (a
term originally proposed by Sarter et al. 1997, p. 1) and the
‘false idea that people and computers have fixed strengths
and weaknesses’ (Dekker and Woods 2002, p. 241). They
argued that ‘capitalizing on some strength of computers
does not replace a human weakness. It creates new human
strengths and weaknesses—often in unanticipated ways’
(Dekker 2005, p. 162). Dekker and Woods recommended
that ‘system developers abandon the traditional ‘who does
what’ question of function allocation’ (p. 243) and consider
how to turn automated systems into effective ‘team players’
that coordinate work. These provocative commentaries by
Dekker and others represent the apex of a move away from
human-in-the-loop control and borrowed engineering
models towards supervisory and cognitive control of
increasingly complex systems (Hancock 2009; Hollnagel
and Cacciabue 1999; Sheridan 2000, 2004). As explained
by McCarthy et al. (2000), the field has seen a ‘shift from a
reductionist separation of qualitatively different humans
and machines, to an attempt at their integration in socio-
technical systems and other systemic approaches’ (p. 198).
This ‘giant swing away from simpler human functions used
with proceduralized equipment to much more complex
cognitive enterprises’ (Meister 1999, p. 222) is driven by a
raft of new technologies (Byrne and Gray 2003), in par-
ticular the computer, which have changed the role of human
operators from manual control to monitoring and directing
of automation (Sheridan 2004).
Theories focusing on complementarity are undoubtedly
useful because they provide broad insight into the variables
that need to be considered in an iterative multivariate design
process. However, they do not provide explicit answers as
to whether a function should be automated or not. They are
also relatively immune to scientific scrutiny, as they cannot
be compared in terms of goodness of fit and the degree of
falsifiability. In response to Dekker and colleagues, Lintern
(in press) argued that abandoning a concrete interest in
function allocation cannot be taken seriously if one wants to
engage with engineers and other design communities.
Sheridan (2004) has also pointed out that the meaning of
human–machine cooperation is yet to be worked out in
terms useful to humans. It is noteworthy that the authors of
the Fitts report already acknowledged the importance of a
systems approach, but also recognised the criterion prob-
lem, and that a reductionist strategy is required: ‘Require-
ments such as safety and efficiency define the goal, or
ultimate criteria, for which the system is designed. How-
ever, the researcher usually cannot deal directly with
Cogn Tech Work (2014) 16:1–11 5
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ultimate criteria but must seek intermediate or proximate
indices-of-merit for various parts of the system’ (p. xii).
3.2.2 The paradox of comparability
Some researchers have attempted to invalidate the Fitts list
on theoretical grounds by pointing out that when human
functions are described in mechanical terms, it is always
possible to generally build a machine that could perform
more efficiently than the human (Hancock and Scallen
1996). This will inescapably lead to the design philosophy to
‘design the man out of the system’ (Jordan 1963, p. 162). As
Jordan further explained it, ‘to the extent that man becomes
comparable to a machine we do not really need him any
more since he can be replaced by a machine’ (p. 162), and
Reason (1987), ‘the credibility of Fitts List foundered on a
simple paradox: If a task could be described exactly (i.e. in
mathematical terms), then a machine should perform it; if
not, it could only be tackled using the ill-defined flexibility
of a human being’ (p. 468). Ironically, ahead of his critics,
Fitts (1962) had already recognised the same paradox: ‘If we
understand how a man performs a function, we will have
available a mathematical model which presumably should
permit us to build a physical device or program a computer
to perform the function in the same way (or in a superior
manner). Inability to build a machine that will perform a
given function as well as or better than a man, therefore,
simply indicates our ignorance of the answers to funda-
mental problems of psychology’ (p. 34).
It can be argued that the paradox is fallacious, since the
Fitts list (1951) explicitly acknowledged that humans sur-
pass machines in aspects that are uniquely human and
cannot be described mechanistically. For example, it was
stated that ‘automatic computers are superior in speed and
accuracy to human brains in deductive reasoning, but no
success has been attained in constructing a machine which
can perform inductive reasoning’ (Fitts 1951, p. 8), and that
‘human engineering, if it is to escape the dilemma of the old
time and motion study engineering, must guard against
exclusive use of the ‘machine’ model in its theory of human
behavior’ (Fitts 1951, p. v, quote from T Gordon in the
editorial forward by MS Viteles). In other words, the criti-
cism that the Fitts list implies that technology determines
the language of attributes (Dekker and Woods 2002) or that
‘technology (with the right capabilities) can be introduced
as a simple substitution of machines for people’ (Woods
2002, p. 15) is false, precisely because the unique heuristic
human capabilities are such a central theme of the list.
3.3 Interpretability and simplicity
The comprehensibility of the Fitts list is perhaps one of the
key reasons behind its success. It does not contain complex
equations, interconnected functions, or other forms of
complexity. According to Sheridan (2004), ‘no other allo-
cation model has replaced it in terms of simplicity and
understandability’ (p. 60). The only simpler function allo-
cation formulations we could find were: ‘humans should be
left deal with the ‘big picture’, while the computer copes
with the details’ (Sheridan 1997, p. 91), and ‘men are
flexible but cannot be depended upon to perform in a
consistent manner whereas machines can be depended
upon to perform consistently but they have no flexibility
whatsoever’ (Jordan 1963, p. 163), both representing the
Fitts list in a reduced form.
3.4 Descriptive adequacy
The categorisation in the Fitts list is qualitative (not
numeric), but indicates the direction of the effect on spe-
cific comparisons. It is therefore more specific than many
other function allocation methods, such as flow charts,
which mention variables that should be taken into consid-
eration but do not provide explicit answers with respect to
what to automate and what not to automate.
The predictions of the Fitts list are in line with empirical
data about how automation is usually implemented in actual
human–machine systems, such as in aviation, robotics, and
car driving. Indeed, ‘in present systems, the machines
(computers) usually take care of data acquisition and
automatic controls, whereas the operators are left with the
tasks of state identification, diagnosis, planning and deci-
sion making’ (Hollnagel and Cacciabue 1999, p. 3) and this
allocation is so embedded in our modern-day thinking that it
can be regarded as obvious (Sheridan 2004). As Sheridan
and Verplank (1978) first stated 25 years ago (see also
Sheridan 2004), it is the lowest-entropy tasks in particular
(routine, repetitive tasks) that are automated, whereas the
high-entropy tasks are left to the human operator, which is
in agreement with the Fitts list. This automation principle
was already discussed in the Fitts report: ‘In general,
machines excel humans in the kinds of things we have
already turned over to them in our society—especially tasks
requiring great strength, and tasks of a very routine nature’
(p. 8).
3.5 Generalisability
The Fitts list applies to a range of different functions, both
physical and mental. Furthermore, and more arguably, the
Fitts list is generalisable over time. When published in
1951, there were few computers (note the vacuum tube in
Fig. 2) and the human factors discipline had only recently
been established. Some have argued that it is no longer
valid because machines have surpassed humans in many
more categories not mentioned in the original Fitts report
6 Cogn Tech Work (2014) 16:1–11
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(Chapanis 1965; Kantowitz and Sorkin 1987; Parasuraman
et al. 2008). Indeed, computers have become a billion
times faster since 1951 (e.g. NUTD’s Tianhe-1A, with a
speed of 2.5 petaflops, deployed in 2010 and IBM’s
Sequoia, with 20 petaflops, expected later this year; see
also Moore’s law; Kurzweil 2005; Moore 1965), with a
speed of response to signals down to the sub-picosecond
(e.g. optical gates, Hulin et al. 1986; atomic clock with an
accuracy of 1 ns per day), inductive reasoning having been
introduced into computers in the form of machine learning,
and computer statistical prediction competing with human
judgement (Grove et al. 2000). Computers now surpass
humans in various perceptual and cognitive activities
under certain circumstances, including playing chess and
face recognition (O’Toole et al. 2009), lip-reading (Hilder
et al. 2009), or answering basic knowledge questions
(Ferrucci 2010).
Despite all these developments, the promises of strong
artificial intelligence set forth in the 1960s have not been
fulfilled. In highly automated systems, the role of the
human is to keep track the bigger picture by perceiving
patterns, inductive reasoning, and improvisation (Sheridan
2004), which is in accordance with the Fitts list. Even in
aviation, one of the most automated disciplines (Sheridan
2004, p. 14), it is anticipated that the role of the human
pilot will remain important for the foreseeable future
(Mulder 2009). This is in line with what the Fitts report
predicted 60 years ago: ‘It appears likely, that for a good
many years to come, human beings will have intensive
duties in relation to air navigation and traffic control’ (Fitts
1951, p. 11).
4 A final word on the Fitts list
Recent research emphasises the fact that automation
introduces various problems such as behavioural adapta-
tion, mistrust and complacency, skill degradation, degraded
situation awareness, problems when reclaiming control and
disruption to mental workload. Indeed, one of the diffi-
culties of function allocation is that automation changes the
nature of human work, often in ways unanticipated by
designers (Bainbridge 1983; Dekker 2005; Parasuraman
and Riley 1997), issues which have been referred to as the
ironies of automation (Bainbridge 1983). Furthermore, as
mentioned in Sect. 3, automation is not an all-or-nothing
phenomenon but can take place at different levels and
stages of machine authority (Endsley and Kaber 1999;
Parasuraman et al. 2000).
Indeed, these issues are not modelled in the Fitts list.
However, the Fitts report identified these issues, decades
before they truly manifest themselves, while not receiving
credit for these predictions.
• The Fitts report was concerned with reclaiming control
when automation fails: ‘We suggest that great caution
be exercised in assuming that men can successfully
monitor complex automatic machines and ‘take over’ if
the machine breaks down’ (Fitts 1951, p. 11), while
recognising the importance of situation awareness:
‘The human should be prepared to take over critical
functions of air-traffic control in case of emergency.
But a man cannot make intelligent decisions in an
emergency unless he has an adequate understanding of
the traffic picture at the moment of the emergency and
for a short time preceding it’ (p. 6).
• The Fitts report was concerned with the phenomenon of
skill degradation. For example, the report explained
that ‘tasks can be set up so that human operators
eventually become deficient in certain important skills
which are infrequently used. As an illustration, a pilot
who relies too much on the auto-pilot may lose some of
his skill in manual control, or one who routinely uses
automatic landing equipment may lose his skill in
making manual landings’ (p. 10), and concluded that
‘activity … is conducive to learning and maintenance
of proficiency’ (p. 6). A 1998 report ‘The future of air
traffic control: Human operators and automation’,
written by a panel of human factors specialists, with
remarkably similar objectives to the 1951 Fitts report,
reached similar conclusions. For example, it reported
that ‘if controllers find these advisories to be effective
in controlling the airspace and come to rely on them,
their own skill in resolving aircraft conflicts may
become degraded’ (Wickens et al. 1998, p. 36), and it
concluded that research is urgently needed to examine
the consequences of skill degradation.
• The Fitts report was concerned with the idea that
automation changes the nature of work, which is
striking, considering that it was not until the 1970s that
computers indeed had a dramatic effect on human–
machine systems (Sheridan 2004) and that research
areas such as supervisory control and cognitive engi-
neering appeared. It stated that: ‘Another possibility is
that the human may routinely perform certain critical
functions, leaving the major work of the system to
semi-automatic machinery. If this turns out to be the
case, then long-range research on human functions
would centre about those higher-level mental functions
we call reasoning, judgment, planning, and decision
making’ (p. 5).
• The Fitts report was concerned with different levels of
automation. In a section considering possible roles of the
human operator in future air traffic control and naviga-
tion systems, a distinction was made between 1. fully
automatic control, 2. automatic control with human
monitoring, 3. semi-automatic control supplemented by
Cogn Tech Work (2014) 16:1–11 7
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human performance of critical functions, and 4. primary
control by human operators who would be assisted by
effective data analysis, data transmission, and data
display equipment.
• The Fitts report recognised the importance of keeping
the human involved. For example, the report con-
cluded: ‘Human tasks should provide activity. The roles
of the human operators in the future air navigation and
traffic control system should be active rather than
passive ones. Activity in any task is conducive to
alertness, and helps to insure that the human will keep
abreast of the situation’ (p. 6). Contemporary research
in air traffic control and situation awareness reaches
rather similar discussions. For example, in an article
about automation in future air traffic management, it
was stated that ‘operators have a better mental model or
awareness of the system state when they are actively
involved in creating the state of the system than when
they are passively monitoring the actions of another
agent or automation (Endsley, 1996; Endsley & Kris,
1995)’ (Metzger and Parasuraman 2005, p. 37).
5 Conclusion
Much has been written about function allocation and
numerous researchers have refined existing models or have
introduced their own. Some of these methods focus on
complementarity of human and machine, and socio-tech-
nical aspects, while other methods have a more restrictive
orientation, focusing on, for example, computational mod-
els for dynamic task allocation. In light of this diverse and
overwhelming amount of important research, arguing in
favour of a 60-year-old concept that has been criticised by
so many may seem absurd. In fact at a later stage even Fitts
(1962) mentioned that he had ‘fell into the trap of trying to
make a list’ (p. 36) and that this effort was ‘trivial and
somewhat misleading’ (p. 36). However, we have shown
that the Fitts list—although perhaps no longer completely
valid in terms of all of its 11 statements because machines
have improved drastically in the last 60 years, leading to
increased automation—can be argued to fulfil the condi-
tions of plausibility, explanatory adequacy, interpretability
and simplicity, descriptive adequacy, and generalisability.
This may explain the pervasiveness of the list throughout
the history of function allocation research. As pointed out
by Jacobs and Grainger, there are, of course, other dimen-
sions along which models or theories may be evaluated.
Examples of other categories that may be informative are
modifiability, research generativity, equivalence class, or
completeness of the models.
In this study, we further argued that many of the dis-
cussions about the ironies of automation are themselves
ironic, because they were already recognised in the Fitts
report, decades before computers became commonplace.
On closer inspection, we agree that the 1951 Fitts report,
‘like many other ‘classics’ in science … is far more often
cited than it is read’ (Hancock 2009, p. 86).
The Fitts list is an approximation that describes the most
important regularities of automation, and the Fitts report
represents an unprecedented intellectual achievement that
has succeeded in its objective to be a pioneering effort. We
believe that the literature of the past decades has created an
inaccurate picture of the Fitts list and we recommend that
researchers cite the Fitts report in a more positive light.
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